Religion, Ethics, and Development Some Comments by Dower, N.
1 8  I S I M  R E V I E W  2 0  /  A U T U M N  2 0 0 7
Dimensions of development 
ethics
Development ethics explores the ethi-
cal basis of development by bringing out 
what is often implicit in development 
discourse.1 Here, I explore briefly three 
dimensions to development ethics. First, 
what are the goals of development? Sec-
ond, what kind of social/political order 
should we try to establish? Third, in what 
ways should we pursue our conception 
of development? 
First, what kind of a society at all are 
we trying to promote in development? If, as is commonly assumed, devel-
opment involves economic growth, what does that growth enable people 
to do or be? At one level, it is about enabling very poor people to escape 
from their poverty—to empower the disempowered—though, as I indi-
cate later, exactly what empowerment is is a matter of dispute. At another 
level it is about enabling people generally to achieve (better) quality of 
life—which may be defined in religious terms or secular/liberal terms. 
The basic concept of development is capable of many conceptions—and 
the latter could be informed by religious values, even fundamentalist reli-
gious values. This issue is explored more fully below.
Second, there is the question of how the goods of development are to 
be achieved. This is the distributive question, often linked with ideas of 
equity and social justice. What is a fair distribution of the bases of well-be-
ing and how can it be achieved? Is the primary vehicle individuals acting 
charitably e.g. giving zakat as a religious duty, or is it various charitable 
NGOs enabling the poor through aid and training, as Harmsen’s article in 
this issue well illustrates? What is the role of the state in this? Do we need 
a conception of social justice such as that provided by John Rawls2 that 
requires redistributive measures like progressive taxation?
Third, there is the fundamental issue of how people are to pursue their 
own goals and also to pursue the goal of development itself. A general 
commitment to non-violence and dialogue is commonly assumed—
and usually also the specific commitment to democratic values as well 
as strong legal protection of rights and liberties including political and 
religious liberty. These are both procedural values 
to do with how we promote social change, but they 
also constitute elements of human well-being itself, 
as it is commonly conceived. But then of course 
there is always a dilemma when a society falls radi-
cally short of our conception of development as it 
should be. Is one then entitled to use violent means 
to achieve change? Here the current process of de-
velopment may, on this view, require violent inter-
ventions and pressures, but its goal is a later stage 
of development in which there will no longer be 
a need for violence. This was the line taken by the 
ANC in pre-1994 South Africa and which is taken by 
Hamas in Palestine. I now explore some of the is-
sues I have raised in more detail.
Nature of development
If development is defined minimally as econom-
ic growth or economic growth with equity, then 
this is consistent with many conceptions of what 
a full human life consists in, whether 
religious or secular. It is usually com-
bined with weak pluralist (liberal) and 
civil society assumptions. (a) Pluralist 
assumption: many different kinds of 
goals and life-styles are consistent with 
this account of development. That is, 
within the general framework of de-
velopment, some people pursue non-
religious goals, some various different 
religious goals, of which some could 
be fundamentalist. (b) Civil society as-
sumption: what is done is pursued in 
ways consistent with law, that is, non-violently, non-coercively, non-
deceptively, and where public decisions have to be made, goals are 
pursued by dialogue and democratic decision/negotiation. 
Within this framework NGOs can pursue a wide range of goals as part 
of civil society, where civil society is defined as commitment to particu-
lar procedural values of certain kinds (but not to the same substantive 
values). For example, a pro-life organization and a family planning or-
ganization may pursue different mutually excluding agendas, but if they 
do so non-violently and seek to get their views accepted democratically, 
then they are part of civil society. (We need to contrast this sense of civil 
society with a wider descriptive sense of civil society which applies to 
any non-state/non-business organization and could include the Mafia 
and the IRA.)
But the pluralist element can be reduced, either somewhat or greatly. 
A society could accept, even encourage, a wide range of life-styles but 
still reject certain ways of life, for instance those of homosexuals or of 
travelling people. A radically secular society might ban all or some reli-
gious ways of life, as we saw at least in public life in USSR’s communism. 
A radically religious society may ban or discourage non-religious ways 
of life; Locke’s famous toleration did not extend to atheists (or indeed 
Catholics). At the extreme it might ban or discourage both secular views 
and indeed any religious ways of life not in accordance with the domi-
nant conception implemented by a government with the backing of 
(sufficient of ) its citizens.
Development then is normatively based. Usually economic growth or 
economic growth with equity is seen as good as a means towards the 
achievement of human flourishing in whatever ways it is conceived, con-
sistent with (a) a system of liberty in which the liberties of some are not 
unreasonably limited by the exercise of liberty by others, and (b) pub-
lic decisions are made in an orderly and non-violent (non-coercive, etc.) 
way. In Western liberal democracies (and other societies like them) the 
framework of liberties and democratic procedures is part of the values 
assumed. In other societies not modelled on Western liberal democra-
cies, there may also be liberties but less of them, and there may either be 
democracy (maybe in different forms), or benign autocracy. (There might 
of course be non-benign autocracies or tyrannies, but these would be 
seen as impediments to, rather than models of, development.)
An example of a Western approach which acknowledges this norma-
tive basis is Sen’s well-known capability approach.3 The expansion of ca-
pabilities to be or do what we have reason to do or be of course includes 
the option of developing a religious conception of a good life. This is not 
of course value-neutral, but it is intended to allow for a wide range of 
conceptions of the good to be enabled by development. But develop-
ment could alternatively be defined in an even less value-neutral way: 
In this article, philosopher Nigel Dower outlines 
the logical implications of the relations 
between religion, ethics, and development. 
In doing so, he shows the importance of 
making explicit the values, assumptions, 
and conceptions that inform discussions of 
development. Only by acknowledging that 
all development agendas are value-driven, 
is a fruitful dialogue between religious 
and secular approaches to development 
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Suppose that empowerment is more 
about enabling people, not to do what 
they want, but to do what they have rea-
son to want (though they may not know 
it). This is more typically what we have 
in mind with children and young peo-
ple. Here education is about expanding 
our capability not merely to take effec-
tive means, but also in our goals and as-
pirations. But even here the non-liberal 
and liberal may both see their inputs 
as creating a richer range of values—in 
the one case by a fuller understanding 
of what one’s religion calls one to do, 
in the other by an understanding of 
the range possibilities which one may 
choose—requiring a society in which 
that range of possibilities is protected 
by law.
An example from my society can be 
given which is in many respects similar 
to what can happen in Muslim societies 
including what voluntary organizations 
are about. A Catholic child, let us sup-
pose, is “indoctrinated” into the Catho-
lic faith and thereafter takes on a life of 
Catholic faith, never seriously question-
ing it. A fellow Catholic may judge that 
that person has been empowered to 
live a fully Catholic life. Even a liberal or a person of another religious 
persuasion could judge that for that person that upbringing has em-
powered him to live a full life. However the liberal (including of course 
liberally minded Catholics) would probably take the view that, had the 
upbringing been less strict and other options made plausible, the per-
son might well have chosen otherwise, and that, whether or not he 
remained a Catholic, it would have been better if a wider range of op-
tions had been built into his education. A person of another religious 
persuasion would either agree with the liberal or, if his own beliefs are 
also held in a certain exclusivist form, have wished for another religious 
education. My point is that empowerment and indoctrination do not 
mutually exclude each other.
(c) The issue of universalism and NGOs
Finally, we need to comment briefly on the issue of universalism 
implicit in NGO work. Any organization within development will, with 
regard to what it does, such as aid for the very poor or empowering 
through training, (a) be precisely committed to empowering people so 
as to make their own choices as to how to live (within the law/ground-
rules of an organized community), or (b) do so with a view to encourag-
ing people to adopt certain specific values and beliefs. But we need to 
see that, as between (a) and (b), they are both working with universal-
istic agendas. There is no problem with an organi-
zation having a universalistic agenda. This is in my 
opinion built into the very logic of ethics and cer-
tainly any ethical basis for an organization pursu-
ing public policies. The real question is what uni-
versal values are being pursued—e.g. the expan-
sion of choice and capacities or the promoting of 
more specific ways of life and belief (or positions 
in between with both elements, like those com-
mitted to development but with strong commit-
ment to environmental consciousness). There are 
also background universalistic commitments, at 
least for those associations which see themselves 
as part of a civil society. These are commitments 
to the procedural values of proceeding in an or-
derly, non-violent non-coercive way, and often 
additionally to democratic procedures as well. 
These are universalistic as well, as is made explicit 
when we accept the idea of global civil society.
development is the expansion of the material basis (wealth) so that peo-
ple can achieve more specific goals such as a particular form of religious 
faith. It is still development, but development defined in more precise 
normative terms than usually in liberal societies. Sustainable develop-
ment and ecological conceptions of development also have built into 
them further substantive values to be achieved, so that insofar as these 
are adopted in Western countries, development is less simply linked to 
the expansion of freedoms.
Within the religious framework, an NGO is more or less free to pursue 
a range of goals: e.g. poverty relief as such, empowerment by provid-
ing training; and doing these things but with a view to encouraging a 
certain set of ethical or religious values, as Harmsen’s thesis shows many 
NGOs in Jordan clearly to be doing. Some it may be said are engaging 
in indoctrination. But this does not make it inconsistent with develop-
ment, though it may be something which others may prefer not to hap-
pen, either because they would prefer something else to indoctrinate or 
because they reject indoctrination as such. They may have rival concep-
tions of development, though the basic concept of development ap-
plies.
Several points about indoctrination
(a) Different views of indoctrination
We may recall here the old proverb: “one man’s meat is another man’s 
poison.” What counts as indoctrination for some may be the imparting 
of reasonable knowledge for another. Is a liberal education that does 
not include kinds of fundamentalism a form of indoctrination? What 
counts as indoctrination depends upon whether one thinks about the 
range of values and beliefs imparted as being either too narrow or sim-
ply wrong, compared with what one thinks is the right set of values and 
beliefs to impart.
(b) Is in any case indoctrination necessarily not empowering?
There are two ways of thinking about empowerment. First, empower-
ment may be enabling people to do what they want but do not have 
the material or motivational resources to do. This could be (weakly) giv-
ing people greater power over their lives so that they can choose to do 
what they want—e.g. greater access to resources. Second, it could be 
(more strongly) giving people the motivational resources to be able 
to make genuine choices of different ends, including what they had 
wanted but also new things they might now want. 
Now indoctrination is consistent with the first level of enabling, but 
not with the second. But the first form of enabling may be all that is 
seen as desirable. This is precisely a key difference between non-liberal 
and liberal views of education. But they are both about empowering 
people to lead fulfilled lives.
Notes
1. The theme of this short paper relates to 
the conference held in Utrecht on 14 June 
2007 on Muslim NGOs in the Middle East, 
organized by ISIM and co-sponsored by 
Hivos. It is partly based on my comments 
on other papers at that conference, and 
partly based on reflections I had made 
on Egbert Harmsen’s thesis on NGOs in 
Jordan. This paper does not make any 
direct contributions specifically on NGOs 
in the Middle East, but it provides a wider 
conceptual framework for thinking about 
development and how it relates to religion.
2. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1971).
3. Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
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